An edition of The origin of ideas
(1883)
The Origin Of Ideas
Volume 2
by Antonio Rosmini
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Table of Contents
CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
SECTION V.
THEORY ON THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS i
PART I.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BEING.
CHAPTER I.
IT IS A FACT THAT WE THINK OF BEING IN
GENERAL
CHAPTER II.
NATURE OF THE IDEA OF BEING IN GENERAL.
ARTICLE
I. The pure idea of being is not any sensible image 13
II. The idea of a thing must be distinguished from the judgment on its subsistence 14
III. The idea of a thing never includes the subsistence of that thing 16
IV. In the idea of being we see nothing but simple possibility 16
V. We can think of nothing without the 'idea' of being. Demonstration of this 17
VI. For the intuition of the idea of being, no other idea is required 19
CHAPTER III.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BEING.
I. The idea of being does not come from corporeal sensations 20
§ 1. 1 st Demonstration, drawn from the first element of the idea of being, and which constitutes its first characteristic, ie. objectivity 20
Observations. — On the differences between sensation, sense-perception, idea, and intellectual perception 22
§ 2. 2nd Demonstration, drawn from the second element of the idea of being, which constitutes its second characteristic, i.e. possibility or ideality 25
Observations. — On the connection between the two general proofs above given of the incapacity of sensations to furnish to us the idea of being 25
§ 3. 3rd Demonstration, drawn from the third characteristic of possible being, i.e. simplicity 26
§ 4. 4th Demonstration, drawn from the fourth characteristic of possible being, i.e. its unlit or identity 27
§ 5. 5th and 6th Demonstrations, drawn from the fifth and sixth characteristics of possible being, i.e. UNIVERSALITY and NECESSITY 27
Observation I — The idea of being is the source of a priori knowledge 28
Observation II — The above characteristics, and especially those of universality and necessity, are contained not only in the idea of being in general, but also in all other ideas without exception 28
Observation III. — Origin of the Platonic system of innate ideas 30
§ 6. 7th and 8th Demonstrations, drawn from the seventh and eighth characteristics of possible b.ing, i.e. immutability and eternity 31
§ 7. 9th Demonstration, drawn from the third element of possible being universally considered, which constitutes its ninth characteristic, i.e. indeterminateness 32
§ 8. A Recapitulation of the foregoing proofs, and some other particular proofs suggested, of the impossibility of deriving a priori knowledge from sensations 35
II. The idea of being does not come from the feeling of our own existence 36
§ 1. This proposition is a consequence of the doctrines above expounded 36
§ 2. Distinction between the feeling and the idea of the Ego 37
§ 3. The feeling of the Ego contains nothing but our own particular existence 38
§ 4. The feeling of our own existence is innate; the intellectual perception of the same is acquired 38
§ 5. The idea of being precedes the idea of the Ego 39
§ 6. Error of Malebranche, who held that we have the intellectual perception of ourselves immediately, i.e. without the medium of an idea 40
III. The idea of being cannot come from Locke's Reflection 41
§ 1. Definition 41
§ 2. 1st Demonstration 43
§ 3. 2nd Demonstration 43
IV. The idea of being does not begin to exist in our mind with the act of perception 46
§ I. 1st Demonstration of this, drawn from the observation of the fact 46
§ 2. 2nd Demonstration, by the argument called REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM 54
V. The idea of being is innate in us 57
§ 1. Demonstration 57
§ 2. Why we find it difficult to advert to the idea of being always present to us 60
§ 3. The theory propounded above was known to the Fathers of the Church 65
PART II.
ORIGIN OF ALL IDEAS GENERALLY BY MEANS OK THE IDEA OF BEING.
CHAPTER I.
GIVEN THE IDEA OF BEING, THE ORIGIN OF THE OTHER IDEAS IS EXPLAINED BY ANALYSING THE ELEMENTS OF WHICH THEY ARE COMPOSED.
I. The connection of the doctrine I have expounded above with that which is to follow 68
II. Analysis of all acquired ideas 69
III. Since all acquired ideas are a compound of two elements, form and matter, a twofold cause is required for their explanation 69
IV. The twofold cause of acquired ideas is the idea of being and sensation 69
V. Doctrine of S. Thomas on the cause of our ideas 70
VI. The true interpretation of the Scholastic dictum: 'There is nothing in the mind which has not been first in the sense' 71
CHAPTER II.
ANOTHER WAY OF EXPLAINING THE ORIGIN OF ACQUIRED IDEAS, THAT IS, BY MEANS OF THE FORMATION OF HUMAN REASON
I. The idea of being, present to our spirit by nature, is that which constitutes the two faculties of Intellect and Reason 73
II. Doctrine of S. Thomas and S. Bonaventure on the formation of the Intellect and the Reason 74
III. Corollary — All acquired ideas proceed from the innate idea of being 75
CHAPTER III.
A THIRD WAY OF EXPLAINING THE ORIGIN OF ACQUIRED IDEAS IN GENERAL, THAT IS, BY MEANS OF THE FACULTIES WHICH PRODUCE THEM.
I. Faculty of Reflection 77
II. Universalisation and Abstraction 79
Observation I — Why the faculty of abstraction has been confused with that of universalisation 81
Observation II. — Universalisation produces the species, abstraction the genera 85
Observation III. — Doctrine of Plato concerning genera and species 86
III. Synthesis of ideas 88
CHAPTER IV.
A FOURTH WAY OF EXPLAINING THE ORIGIN OF ACQUIRED IDEAS GENERALLY, THAT IS, BY MEANS OF A SUMMARY CLASSIFICATION OF THEM.
I. Classification of our intellections 89
II. Where lies the difficulty of explaining the three classes of ideas just enumerated 91
III. Necessity of language for moving our understanding to form abstract ideas 93
§ 1. Our soul is drawn to the act of perception by sensible things 94
Observations. — On the limits of the intellectual development attainable by human beings cut off from all society, and whose intelligence therefore would have no other stimuli than sensations and corporeal images 96
§ 2. The corporeal images sufficiently account for that activity by which our spirit forms ideas separated from perceptions 98
§ 3. Language is sufficient to account for that activity whereby we form abstract ideas 98
Observation I — Of an objection that might be taised against what we have said, on the score of human free-will 102
Observation II. — On the intellectual development attained by men through social intercourse and language, and on the necessity of this development in order that we may gain the free use of our powers 104
IV. The intellectual perception is explained
§ 1. We have no other intellectual perception than that of ourselves and of bodies 106
§ 2. What is required to explain intellectual perception 108
§ 3. Explanation of the judgment which generates in us the perception of bodies 110
Observation I. — Doctrine of the ancients on the Word of the Mind 113
Observation II. — Relation between an idea and the word of the mind 115
V. Necessity of the intellectual perception 115
Observation I — On the question, 'Is the human soul always thinking?' 117
Observation II. — In what sense the intellect is a tabula rasa 118
CHAPTER V.
THE INNATE IDEA OF BEING SOLVES THE GENERAL DIFFICULTY PRESENTED BY THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
I. Solution of the difficulty 120
II. Objections and replies 120
§ 1. First objection 120
Answer to first objection 121
§ 2. The first objection is urged with greater force 122
Continuation of answer to first objection 122
§ 3. Second objection 127
Answer to second objection 128
Corollary I — There is an idea which precedes all judgments 132
Corollary II. — There is in man an intellectual sense 132
Observation I. — Difference between the corporeal sense and the intellectual 133
Observation II. — The Nature of Ideal Being 134
PART III.
ORIGIN OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF REASONING.
CHAPTER I.
FIRST PRINCIPLE — THAT OF COGNITION. SECOND PRINCIPLE — THAT OF CONTRADICTION 137
CHAPTER II.
THIRD PRINCIPLE -THAT OF SUBSTANCE. FOURTH PRINCIPLE — THAT OF CAUSATION 142
CHAPTER III.
WHAT ARE SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES IN GENERAL? 145
CHAPTER IV.
ORIGIN OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES IN GENERAL 147
PART IV.
ORIGIN OF PURE IDEAS, THAT IS TO SAY, OF THOSE IDEAS WHICH TAKE NOTHING FROM THE SENSE.
CHAPTER I.
ORIGIN OF THE ELEMENTARY IDEAS, OR CONCEPTS OF IDEAL BEING, WHICH ARE ASSUMED IN HUMAN REASONINGS.
ARTICLE
I. Enumeration of the elementary concepts contained in ideal
being 148
II. Origin of these concepts 148
Observation 149
III. Reasonings of St. Augustine on the ideas of unity, of number, and such like, which confirm the theory I have expounded 149
CHAPTER II.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE
I. State of the question about the origin of the idea of substance 160
II. Description and analysis of all that we think concerning substances 161
§ 1. Where ought the inquiry concerning the ideas of substance to begin? 161
§ 2. Definition of substance 162
§ 3. Analysis of the concept of substance 162
§ 4. Various modes of the idea of substance 163
§ 5. Origin of the idea of 'Individual' 166
§ 6. Judgments on the subsistence of substances, and how they differ from the ideas of substances 167
§ 7. Recapitulation of all the thoughts the human mind forms about substances 168
III. The above three ideas of substance proceed one from the other 168
IV. In explaining the judgments we make on the subsistence of substances, there is but one difficulty to overcome 169
V. The explanation of the specific idea of substance depends on the solution of the difficulty which is found in accounting for the judgments on the subsistence of substances 170
VI. Explanation of the intellectual perception of individuals 170
CHAPTER III.
A FURTHER ELUCIDATION REGARDING THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE
I. Necessity of this elucidation 172
II. Enumeration of the various systems on the origin of the idea of substance 172
III. Another way for discovering the origin of the idea of substance 175
IV. First proposition 'If our mind thinks at all, it thinks of something' 176
V. Second proposition: 'Everything can be an object of the mind' 177
§ 1. Demonstration 177
§ 2. Objection against the principle of contradiction 177
§ 3. Reply to the above objection; defence of the principle of contradiction 178
§4. Conclusion of the demonstration 180
VI. Third proposition: 'Our mind cannot perceive the sensible qualities, without perceiving them as existing in a subject' 180
VII. Distinction between the Idealism of Hume and that of Berkeley 180
VIII. Confutation of the Idealism of Hume 181
IX. Origin of the idea of accident 184
X. A few words on the invariability of substance 191
XI. The sensible qualities do not exist by themselves (are not substances) 194
CHAPTER IV.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.
I. Object of the present chapter 197
II. Proposition 198
III. Analysis of the above proposition, directed to point out the knot of the difficulty 198
IV. The one difficulty found in accounting for the origin of the idea of cause is explained 201
V. Distinction between Substance and Cause 205
VI. The understanding integrates the sense- perceptions 207
VII. Application of the above Doctrine on Substance to the internal sense 209
CHAPTER V.
A HINT ON THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF TRUTH, OF JUSTICE, AND OF BEAUTY 212
PART V.
ORIGIN OF NON-PURE IDEAS, THAT IS, OF THOSE WHICH, FOR THEIR FORMATION, TAKE SOMETHING FROM THE SENSE.
CHAPTER I.
ORIGIN OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE IDEAS OF CORPOREAL AND SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE
I. On the doctrine laid down above respecting substance and cause 214
II. Argument of the following discussion 216
III. Difference between the idea of 'cause' and the idea of 'subject' 217
IV. A further analysis of sensation 218
§ 1. Object of this analysis 218
§ 2. In the sentient subject there is something else besides the act by which its sensations exist 219
§ 3. The subject of the sensible qualities cannot be an act extending to them alone 221
V. Distinction between the idea of substance and that of essence 223
§ 1. Definition of essence 223
§ 2. Specific essence, generic essence, and most universal essence 223
§ 3. On specific essence 224
§ 4. On generic essences 228
§ 5. A more perfect definition of substance 230
VI. Resumption of the argument 231
VII. There exists a subject (the Ego) which perceives the sensations 232
VIII. The concept of the Ego (percipient subject) is entirely different from the concept of corporeal substance 232
§ 1. There are in us two series of facts, in respect of one of which we are active, and of the other passive 232
§ 2. In the active facts, we are both the cause and the subject; in the passive, we are the subject but not the cause 234
§ 3. That which we call body is the proximate cause of our external sensations 235
§ 4. Our spirit is not body 239
IX. Simplicity of our spirit 245
CHAPTER II.
ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE
I. A way to demonstrate the existence of bodies 246
II. There exists a proximate cause of our sensations 246
III. The cause distinct from ourselves is a substance 246
IV. The substance which causes our sensations is immediately conjoined with them 247
V. The cause of our sensations is a limited being 247
VI. We give names to things according as our mind conceives them 247
VII. Rule to be observed in the use of words, in order to avoid error 248
VIII. Bodies are limited beings
IX. The proximate cause of our sensations is not God 249
X. Bodies exist, and cannot be confounded with God 249
XI. Refutation of the Idealism of Berkeley 249
XII. Reflections on the above demonstration of the existence of bodies 254
CHAPTER III.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF OUR OWN BODY AS DISTINGUISHED FROM EXTERNAL BODIES, BY MEANS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FEELING (SENTIMENTO FONDAMENTALE).
I. First classification of the qualities we observe in bodies 260
II. Classification of the corporeal qualities which constitute the immediate relation of bodies with our spirit 264
III. Distinction between life and the fundamental feeling 265
IV. Two ways of perceiving our own body; the one subjective and the other extrasubjective 267
V. The subjective way of perceiving our own body is twofold, namely, one through the fundamental feeling, and the other through the modifications of that feeling 26
VI. Explanation of sensation in so far as it is a modification of the fundamental feeling we have of our body 270
VII. Explanation of sensation in so far as it is perceptive of external bodies 271
VIII. Difference between our own body and the bodies external to us 272
IX. A description of the fundamental feeling 274
X. Existence of the fundamental feeling 281
XI. The origin of our sensations confirms the existence of the fundamental feeling 286
XII. Explanation of the saying of S. Thomas, 'that the body is in the soul' 287
XIII. The physical commerce between the soul and the body 288
CHAPTER IV.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF OUR BODY BY MEANS OF THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FEELING.
I. The analysis of sensation is resumed 289
II. Definition of the fundamental feeling, and distinction between it and the sensitive perception of bodies 290
III. Origin and nature of corporeal pleasure and pain 291
IV. The relation of corporeal pleasure and pain to extension 292
V. Refutation of the opinion of Ideologists 'that we first feel everything in the brain, and then refer the sensation to the different parts of our body 9 294
VI. The two subjective ways of feeling and perceiving the extension of our own body are compared together 296
VII. Another proof of the existence of the fundamental feeling 297
VIII. All our sensations are at once subjective and extrasubjective 298
IX. Description of the touch as a universal sense 301
X. Origin of the sense of touch 302
XI. Relation between the two subjective ways of perceiving our body 302
CHAPTER V.
CRITERION OF THE EXISTENCE OF BODIES.
I. An improved definition of bodies 304
II. General criterion for our judgments concerning the existence of bodies 308
III. Application of the general criterion 308
IV. The certainty of the existence of our own body is the criterion of the existence of other bodies 310
V. Application of the criterion to the errors which sometimes occur in reference to the existence of some particular member of our body 310
VI. Refutation of the idealistic argument drawn from dreams 312
CHAPTER VI.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF TIME
I. Connection of the doctrines already explained with those which are to follow 313
II. The idea of Time as acquired from the consciousness we have of our own actions 314
III. The idea of time as suggested by the actions of beings other than ourselves 316
IV. The pure idea of time 316
V. The idea of pure time as indefinitely long 317
VI. On the continuity of time 317
§ 1. Everything that happens, happens by instants 317
§ 2. In the idea of time, as supplied by observation alone, we can find no solution of the above difficulty 318
§ 3. Necessity of having recourse to the simple possibilities of things, and importance of not confounding them with real things 321
§ 4. Time, as known by observation alone, is simply a relation between the respective quantities of actions, given the same acting intensity 322
§ 5. The idea of pure time, and that of its indefinite length and divisibility are mere possibilities or mental concepts 322
§ 6. The phenomenal idea of the continuity of time is illusory 324
§ 7. The continuity of time is simply a possibility or a mental concept 328
§ 8. Distinction between the absurd and the mysterious 329
§ 9. In the duration of completed actions there is no succession, and therefore that duration does not give us the idea of time, but only of continuity 330
§ 10. The idea of being in general, which constitutes our intelligence, is exempt from time 331
CHAPTER VII.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF MOTION
I. Motion is perceived by us in three ways 332
II. Description of active motion 333
III. Description of passive motion 334
IV. Our motion does not, by itself, fall under our sense-perception 335
V. The motion which takes place in our sensitive organs falls under our sense-perception 336
VI. Relation between motion and sensation 338
VII. On motion considered relatively to the perception of the touch 339
VIII. On motion considered relatively to the perception of the sight 340
IX. On motion considered relatively to the perception of the hearing, the smell, and the taste 341
X. On the continuity of motion 341
§ 1. Observation does not reach exceedingly minute extensions 341
§ 2. The continuity of motion as presented to us by observation is purely phenomenal 342
§ 3. The real continuity of motion is an absurdity 342
§ 4. Solution of the objection drawn from the fact that 'Nature does nothing by leaps' 342
§ 5. Mental continuity of motion 344
CHAPTER VIII.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF SPACE
I. Distinction between the idea of space and that of body 345
II. Extension or space is unlimited 345
III. Space or extension is continuous 347
IV. Of real continuity 349
V. The continuous has no parts 349
VI. The continuous may be mentally limited 350
VII. In what sense it can be said that the 'continuous' is divisible ad infinitum 351
CHAPTER IX.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BODIES BY MEANS OF THE EXTRASUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF THE TOUCH.
I. The analysis of the extrasubjective perception of bodies in general begins 352
II. Ail our senses give us the perception of a something different from us 353
III. All our senses give us the perception of a something outside of us 353
IV. The touch, taken by itself alone, perceives only the surfaces of bodies 354
V. The touch combined with motion gives us the idea of solid space. 355
VI. Recapitulation of the ways in which we form the idea of solid space 356
VII. The idea of space, as formed by means of the touch combined with motion, is more easily adverted to than that formed by means of the fundamental feeling combined also with motion 357
VIII. The space perceived through the motions of the sensations of touch is identical with the space perceived through the motions of the fundamental feeling 357
IX. The identity of the extension of our own body and of the external body forms the link of communication between the idea of the one and the idea of the other 358
X. Continuation 358
XI. The subjective perception of our own body is the medium of the extrasubjective perception of other bodies 360
XII. Of the extension of bodies 361
§ 1. Multiplicity is not essential to the corporeal nature 361
§ 2. Complex unity of our sensitive body 362
§ 3. About the unity of our body we cannot be mistaken 363
§ 4. Multiplicity of the feeling we have of our body 364
§ 5. Multiplicity perceived by us in external bodies 365
§ 6. Distinction between Body and Corporeal principle 365
$ 7. Assuming that corporeal sensation terminates in a continuous extension, we are bound to admit a really continuous extension also in the bodies which produce that sensation 367
§ 8. The sensitive parts of our body do not produce a sensation more extended than they are themselves 370
§ 9. The extension of external bodies is neither larger nor smaller than that of the sensations which they produce in us 371
§ 10. In our tactile sensations there is a phenomenal continuity 371
§ 11. The elementary sensations have a truly continuous extension 372
§ 12. The elementary bodies have a continuous extension 374
$ 13. Refutation of the opinion that the elementary bodies consist of simple points 375
XIII. The definition of body is perfected 376
XIV. External bodies are perceived by means of the touch combined with motion 376
XV. Origin of the idea of mathematical body 378
XVI. Origin of the idea of physical body 379
CHAPTER X.
THE PARTICULAR CRITERION OF THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES.
I. The criterion of the existence of external bodies is only an application of the general criterion of the existence of bodies 380
II. Application of the criterion of the existence of external bodies 381
CHAPTER XI.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS SUBJECTIVE AND WHAT IS EXTRASUBJECTIVE IN EXTERNAL SENSATIONS.
I. Necessity of this discussion 382
II. Some truths recalled to mind 382
III. The mind analyses our sensations 383
IV. General principle for distinguishing between the subjective and the extrasubjective part of our sensations 383
V. Application of the general principle to find the extrasubjective part of our sensations 384
VI. On the distinction between the primary and the secondary properties of bodies 385
VII. Application of the general principle to discover the subjective part of our sensations 386
VIII. How far minute extensions can be perceived by our sense of touch 390
IX. On the extrasubjective sensation of the sight, the hearing, the smell, and the taste 395
CHAPTER XII.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BODIES BY MEANS OF THE EXTRASUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF THE SIGHT.
I. The eye perceives coloured surfaces 401
II. Coloured surfaces are corporeal 401
III. The coloured surfaces are identical with the surface of the retina of the eye affected by the light 401
IV. The coloured surface perceived by our eye is precisely of the same extension as the retina touched by the light; but in that surface the colours are distributed according to constant proportions 402
V. The coloured surface cannot give us the idea of solid space, even by means of the movements which take place in its colours 403
VI. The sensations of colours are so many signs of the sizes of things 404
VII. The sight, associated with touch and motion, perceives distances and the qualities of the motion of our own body 409
VIII. The smell, the hearing, and the taste, compared with the sight 412
CHAPTER XIII.
CRITERION OF THE SIZE AND FORM OF BODIES.
I. The criterion of the size of bodies consists in the size perceived by the touch 414
II. Application of the criterion to illusions concerning the visible size of things 415
III. Application of the criterion to the visual illusions concerning the distances of things 421
IV. Application of the criterion to the illusions concerning the position of things 422
V. The criterion of the figure of bodies consists in their figure as perceived by the touch 427
VI. Errors which the sight occasions concerning the figure and size of bodies 428
CHAPTER XIV.
ON THE EXTRASUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF BODIES BY MEANS OF THE FIVE SENSES CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO ONE ANOTHER.
I. Different sensations are united and cause us to perceive one and the same body by all referring together to one and the same space 429
II. Of all sense-perceptions, the visual is that which most arrests our attention 430
III. Do we in our sensations receive only the species of corporeal things, or do we perceive the things themselves? 433
IV. Error of Reid in excluding all sensible species in our perception of bodies 435
V. Reid's distinction between sensation and perception 435
VI. Galluppi makes an improvement in the philosophy of Reid 438
VII. What does the author's analysis of sensation, as above explained, add to the theory of Galluppi? 439
CHAPTER XV.
ON THE SENSITIVE AND INTELLECTUAL PERCEPTIONS OF BODIES CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER.
I. Distinction of the two perceptions, sensitive and intellective. 442
II. Locke confounds the sensitive perception of bodies with the intellective objections urged against him in consequence 445
III. Reid understood better than the other philosophers the activity of the human spirit in the formation of ideas, and yet he fell into the same error as they 448
IV. Continuation 452
V. Do we perceive bodies through the principles of substance and of causation? 455
VI. The intellectual perception was confounded with the sensitive, in respect also of the internal feeling and of the Ego 457
CHAPTER XVI.
ON THE NATURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SENSITIVELY PERCEIVING OUR BODY AS CO-SENTIENT WITH OURSELVES, AND SENSITIVELY PERCEIVING IT AS A FORCE ACTING EXTERNALLY ON US.
I. Differences between the two principal ways of sensitively perceiving our body, i.e. subjectively, or as co-sentient with us; and extrasubjectively, or as a force acting externally on us 461
II. Has the mechanical impression made on us by external things any likeness to the sensation which follows upon it? 462
III. Materialism refuted 466
IV. The line of demarcation between Physiology and Psychology 473
V. On the systems that have been propounded concerning the union of our soul with the body 474
VI. Relation between our body considered as external to us and as co-subject with us 476
VII. On the matter of the fundamental feeling 477
PART VI.
CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER I.
EPILOGUE OF THE THEORY 489
CHAPTER II.
IN WIIAT STATE THE AUTHOR FOUND THE DOCTRINE
ON THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS 403
CHAPTER III.
THE WAY IN WHICH THE STUDIOUS MAY MASTER THE THEORY EXPOUNDED ABOVE ON THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS 500
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